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Ideas of Roderick Chisholm, by Text
[American, 1916 - 1999, Taught at Brown University, Long Island.]
1964
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Human Freedom and the Self
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p.93
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9268
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If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt]
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p.24
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p.24
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3442
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Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused
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p.25
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p.25
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3443
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Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires?
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p.28
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p.28
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3444
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If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person
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p.28
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p.28
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3445
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Causation among objects relates either events or states
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p.32
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p.32
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3446
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For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs
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1964
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The Myth of the Given
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§12
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p.118
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8790
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The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying
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p.83
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20062
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If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong
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p.20
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p.65
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20054
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There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent
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1966
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Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed 1977)
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p.360
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19569
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We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Kvanvig]
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1967
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Identity through Possible Worlds
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p.81-2
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p.81
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11965
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Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa?
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p.85
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p.85
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11966
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If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are?
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Intro 1
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p.15
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15801
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Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves
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Intro 2
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p.17
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15802
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I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout
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Intro 4
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p.20
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15803
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Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process
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1.4
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p.28
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15804
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If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine'
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1.4
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p.28
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15806
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The property of being identical with me is an individual concept
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1.4
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p.29
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15808
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A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics
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1.4
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p.29
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15805
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Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity
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1.4
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p.29
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15807
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A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity
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1.4
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p.30
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15809
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A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property
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1.5
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p.31
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15810
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Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves
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1.5
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p.33
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15811
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I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself'
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1.5
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p.36
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15813
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People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence
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1.6
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p.38
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15814
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A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities
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1.8
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p.47
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15815
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Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent'
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1.8
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p.49
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15816
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'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book'
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1.8
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p.50
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15817
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If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'?
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1.8
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p.50
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15818
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So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them
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1.8
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p.51
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15819
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Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter?
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2.2
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p.58
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15820
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A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary
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2.2
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p.59
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15821
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Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition
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2.3
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p.60
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15822
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The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature
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2.5
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p.69
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15823
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Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation'
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2.6
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p.73
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15824
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There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission'
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3.2
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p.92
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15826
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There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ
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3.4
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p.100
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15827
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Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had'
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4.1
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p.114
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15828
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I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs
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4.2
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p.117
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15829
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The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted
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4.2
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p.119
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15830
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Some properties can never be had, like being a round square
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4.4
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p.124
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15831
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Explanations have states of affairs as their objects
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4.6
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p.127
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15832
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Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times
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p.149
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p.189
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12852
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If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Simons]
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p.90
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p.188
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12851
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Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Simons]
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1996
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A Realistic Theory of Categories
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p.3
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p.14
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13120
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Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Westerhoff]
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